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A New Industry Concentration Index
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Abstract
We propose and analyse a new concentration index alternative to
the Herndahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). This new index emphasizes
the concept of competitive balance. It is designed to preserve the
convexity property of the HHI when a merger involves one of the
m largest rms, but to decrease and thus to indicate an increase in
competition when a merger is purely among the (n m) smallest rms.
Keywords: Horizontal mergers, dominant rms, small rms, competitive
balance, concentration index.
JEL Classication Number: L10
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1 Introduction
Merger analysis often involves a comparison between the pre- and post-
merger degrees of concentration in a market. This degree of concentration
matters since a high concentration measure is supposed to proxy for lack of
competitiveness in that market. The standard index that is used to mea-
sure the level of concentration in an industry is the Herndahl-Hirschman
Index (HHI). The HHI possesses the so-called convexity property in that
it increases whenever there is a `mean preserving spread' of rms' market
shares in an industry. Consequently, it yields a higher concentration level in
response to any merger between rms.
Suppose that there are three rms with percentage market shares of 70, 25
and 5 in Industry 1. Ceteris paribus, the HHI would deem that this industry
is more concentrated and thus less competitive than another one, Industry 2,
which has market shares of 70, 15 and 15. This can be far from obvious, since
in Industry 2, a dominant rm facing two relatively small and potentially
insignicant rivals may simply `follow' the lead of the dominant rm whereas,
in contrast, in Industry 1, the dominant rm facing a competitor with a 25%
market share may be able to provide greater competitive restraint to the
dominant rm than two equally-sized but smaller rivals of Industry 2 can.
Similarly, using the HHI a merger of two 15% market-share rms when
there is a single rival would raise theHHI and may be deemed anti-competitive.
This too can be far from obvious, since a 30% rival may prove to be far more
vigorous and competitive against the dominant rm than two 15% rms.1
1With such a merger, the HHI would rise from 5; 350 pre-merger (using the standard
convention of normalizing the HHI to be out of 10; 000) to 5; 800 post-merger. Conse-
quently, as can be seen from 'safe harbour' examples below, this merger would certainly fall
outside any safe harbours established in merger guidelines issued by competition regula-
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Given this issue with the HHI (and the other concentration indices that
will be briey discussed in the next section), in most jurisdictions a merger
that would lead to signicant cost savings and so raise welfare would have
a path to legal clearance (for example 'authorisation' in Australia, the 'rule-
of-reason' in the United States). Hence, in reality an increase in the HHI
would not stop a merger but rather would force the merging parties to prove
their cost savings, although it may be possible that a merger of small rms
can raise competition directly, even if there are no cost savings.
Noting these issues with the HHI (and other indices below), we propose
and analyse an alternative index which emphasizes the concept of 'competi-
tive balance'.2 This new index is designed to have the convexity property of
the HHI when a merger involves one of the m largest rms, but to decrease
and thus to indicate an increase in competition when a merger is purely
among the (n m) smallest rms.3
tors in Australia, the European Union and the United States, for instance. (Safe harbours
dene tolerable post-merger market concentration and/or concentration-change thresh-
olds, above which proposed mergers are deemed likely to be anti-competitive. They are
typically set via the HHI and changes in the HHI, i.e., HHI.)
Australia: HHI < 2000; or HHI > 2000 and HHI < 100:
The European Union: HHI < 1000; or HHI is between 1000 2000 and HHI < 250;
or HHI > 2000 and HHI < 150.
The United States current: HHI < 1000; or HHI is between 1000 1800 and HHI <
100; or HHI > 1800 and HHI < 50:
The United States proposed: HHI < 1500; or HHI < 100.
See Yang and Pickford (2011).
2See Gans (2000) who provides a detailed evaluation of the `competitive balance'
concept.
3Gugler et al. (2003) provide strong evidence that among mergers that increase prots,
those involving larger rms achieve these prots by increasing their market power, while
mergers involving smaller rms achieve higher prots by increasing eciency.
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2 A Brief Review of Concentration Indices
Let the market shares of n rms be listed as v1  v2  :::  vn > 0
where
P
vi = 1. As mentioned above, the standard, most-prominent industry
concentration index is the (HHI): HHI(v1; :::; vn) = (a1v1+:::+anvn), where
ai = vi so that the weights, a1; :::; an; sum to one.
Another notable concentration index, the four-rm concentration ratio
(C4), does not depend on the market shares of rms which are not the
largest four rms: C4(v1; v2; v3; v4) = (v1 + v2 + v3 + v4). Neither does it
assign dierent weights to dierent market shares of the rms.
There are a few other notable concentration indices. One, proposed by
Hall and Tideman (1967), stresses the need to include the number of the rms
in the calculation when measuring the concentration level of an industry (the
number of rms measures the ease of entry into that particular industry).
The Hall-Tideman concentration index (HTI) is 1
(2
Pn
i=1 ivi) 1 .
The other one, an index of entropy, E =  Pni=1 vi log vi is discussed by
Hart (1967, p. 78). Unlike the other indices considered thus far, it does
not have a range of 0 to 1. Rather, it takes the value 0 when the market
structure is a monopoly and takes a value far exceeding 1 when the market
structure is perfect competition.
Finally, Dansby and Willig (1979) introduced alternative performance in-
dices that measure the potential social gains from appropriate government in-
terventions (such as anti-trust, regulatory, and deregulatory actions). Their
performance indices establish a welfare theoretic basis for indices such as
C4, HHI, and others. Essentially, Dansby-Willig versions of these indices
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incorporate a weight that is the inverse of the price elasticity of the industry
demand. Alternatively, Blackorby, Donaldson and Weymark (1982) (who use
a Cobb-Douglas functional form) provided an index that assigns weights to
not only rms' market shares but also to total output.
Note that any merger would increase the measure of industry concentra-
tion according to all of the indices above, except for C4 in which any merger
beyond the largest four rms would not have a neither negative nor positive
eect on the measure of concentration unless the newly merged rm itself
becomes one of the largest four rms.
3 CB* - The Competitive Balance Index
The `competitive balance' index we propose has dierent implications than
the indices discussed above when horizontal mergers do not include the
largest rm(s). Denote this index when there are m dominant rms in an
industry as CB(m), where 1  m  n. When m = 1, Firm i's market
share relative to that of the sole dominant rm is vi
v1
. It follows that the total
market shares, relative to the largest rm's market share is v1
v1
+ v2
v1
+ :::+ vn
v1
.
We rst consider this index when market shares of rms are measured in
terms of only the largest rm's market share, CB(1).
CB(1) =
1
(v1
v1
)2 + (v2
v1
)2 + :::+ (vn
v1
)2
=
1
[(v1)2 + (v2)2 + :::+ (vn)2]
1
(v1)2
5
=
(v1)
2
(v1)2 + (v2)2 + :::+ (vn)2
:
Observe that CB(1) = (v1)
2
HHI
.
Table 1 provides a few examples to illustrate the stark dierences between
the HHI and CB(1).
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Table 1: A Comparison of the HHI and CB(1) under Dierent Market
Share Proles
v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 v6 v7 HHI CB
(1)
70 5 5 5 5 5 5 .50 .97
70 30 .58 .84
51 26 11 11 1 .35 .74
51 37 11 1 .41 .64
40 37 11 11 1 .32 .5
40 37 9 9 5 .32 .51
33 33 33 .33 .33
50 50 .5 .5
55 45 .52 .6
55 35 10 .44 .7
55 25 20 .41 .75
40 40 20 .36 .44
40 40 10 10 .34 .47
40 20 20 20 .28 .57
Although there may be industries in which increasing the market share
of the second largest rm could cause a reduction in the industry price, in
many industries a reduction in price could not be achieved until a higher
critical number of large rms is reached. For example, Lamm (1981, p. 75)
reports empirical ndings from the food retailing industry that in many urban
markets \growth in the 3 largest rms' shares have a signicant positive
eects on prices... In contrast, an increase in the market share of the fourth
largest rm causes a reduction in food prices." This clearly indicates that
the number of dominant rms in a market may be greater than one which
is critically important to the analysis of a potential merger. Thus, we now
explore our index with m > 1 dominant rms, CB(m).
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CB(m) =
1
v21
v21+:::+v
2
m
+
v22
v21+:::+v
2
m
+ :::+ v
2
n
v21+:::+v
2
m
=
1
[(v1)2 + (v2)2 + :::+ (vn)2]
1
v21+:::+v
2
m
=
v21 + :::+ v
2
m
(v1)2 + (v2)2 + :::+ (vn)2
:
Observe that when m > 1; CB(m) = v
2
1+:::v
2
m
HHI
.
The following proposition describes how CB(m) behaves in mergers that
do and do not involve the largest rm.
Proposition 1 (1) If merger does not involve the m largest rms and does
not make the new rm one of the m largest rms, then CB(m) decreases.
(2) If a merger involves one or two of the m largest rms, then CB(m)
increases.
Proof: (1) Since [(v1)
2+(v2)
2+:::+(vn)
2] increases in any merger, CB(m) =
v21+:::+v
2
m
(v1)2+(v2)2+:::+(vn)2
must decrease in any merger that does not involve any of
v1; v2; :::; vm. (2) Consider CB
(m) = v
2
1+:::+v
2
m
(v1)2+:::+(vm)2+:::+(vn)2
. Suppose Firm
i and Firm j merge such that i  m and j > m. Thus, after the merger
CB0(m) =
v21+:::+v
2
i 1+v
2
i+1+:::v
2
m+(vi+vj)
2
v21+:::+v
2
i 1+v
2
i+1+:::+v
2
m+(vi+vj)
2+:::+(vj 1)2+(vj+1)2+:::+(vn)2
. Let A =
(v1)
2+:::+(vm)
2 and B = (v1)
2+:::+(vm)
2+:::+(vn)
2; hence, B > A. Thus,
CB(m) becomes A
B
and CB0(m) becomes A+(vi+vj)
2 v2i
B+(vi+vj)2 v2i v2j
. Then CB0(m)
T CB(m) reduces to Bv2j + 2Bvivj T 2Avivj. Since B > A, we obtain
CB0(m) > CB(m).
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For the second case where Firm i and Firm j merge such that i; j  m;
slightly modify the above argument.
The next proposition describes how much CB(m) increases when Firm
j merges with Firm i instead of with Firm i0 where vi > vi0 > vm > vj.
Proposition 2 Consider a merger M between Firm i and Firm j, and a
merger M 0 between Firm i0 and Firm j, where vi > vi0 > vm > vj. Then
CB(m;M) > CB(m;M 0).
Proof: CB(m;M) =
v21+:::+v
2
i 1+v
2
i+1+:::v
2
m+(vi+vj)
2
v21+:::+v
2
i 1+v
2
i+1+:::+v
2
m+(vi+vj)
2+:::+(vj 1)2+(vj+1)2+:::+(vn)2
and CB(m;M 0) =
v21+:::+v
2
i0 1+v
2
i0+1+:::v
2
m+(vi0+vj)2
v21+:::+v
2
i0 1+v
2
i0+1+:::+v
2
m+(vi0+vj)2+:::+(vj 1)2+(vj+1)2+:::+(vn)2
.
Let A = (v1)
2 + ::: + (vm)
2 and B = (v1)
2 + ::: + (vm)
2 + ::: + (vn)
2. Thus,
CB(m;M) becomes A+(vi+vj)
2 v2i
B+(vi+vj)2 v2i v2j
and CB(m;M 0) becomes
A+(vi0+vj)2 v2i0
B+(vi0+vj)2 v2i0 v2j
.
Then CB(m;M) T CB(m;M 0) reduces to A+v
2
j+2vivj
B+2vivj
T A+v
2
j+2vi0vj
B+2vi0vj
. Since
B > A+ v2j and 2vivj > 2vi0vj, we obtain CB
(m;M) > CB(m;M 0).
The implication of the preceding proposition is that according to CB(m),
a merger between a small rm and a relatively large dominant rm will
increase the concentration level in that industry more than will a merger
between the same small rm and a relatively small dominant rm. Thus,
Propositions 1 and 2 verify that CB(m) satises the convexity property of
the HHI when a merger involves one of the m largest rms, but decreases
and thus indicates an increase in competition when a merger is purely among
the (n m) smallest rms.
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Table 2 considers several dierent market settings in an attempt to gauge
how the HHI and CB respond to proposed mergers. In each row, merging
rms' pre-merger market shares are denoted with a box around them. For
instance, Rows 1   5 entail a situation in which there is one dominant rm
and six identical smaller rms. All of the smaller rms merge in Row 1, ve
of the smaller rms merge in Row 2, and so on. The last two columns furnish
the predicted changes in the two indices. Observe that HHI increases while
I decreases for each merger.
Table 2: Changes in HHI and CB Resulting from Mergers
v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 v6 v7 HHI CB
(1)  in HHI  in CB(1)
70 5 5 5 5 5 5 .50 .97 .08 -.13
70 5 5 5 5 5 5 .50 .97 .06 -.09
70 5 5 5 5 5 5 .50 .97 .04 -.06
70 5 5 5 5 5 5 .50 .97 .02 -.03
70 5 5 5 5 5 5 .50 .97 .01 -.01
70 10 10 10 .52 .94 .06 -.10
70 10 10 10 .52 .94 .02 -.03
51 25 12 12 .35 .74 .15 -.22
51 25 24 .38 .68 .12 -.16
60 20 10 10 .42 .86 .10 -.17
60 20 10 10 .42 .86 .02 -.04
60 20 20 .44 .82 .08 -.13
4 Discussion: An Example
The general idea behind our index is that a merger between two small rms
that creates a more competitive mix of rms should be allowed, even if that
mix yields a net reduction in the number of rms by one and an increase
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in the HHI. The main purpose of this discussion section is to provide an
example of mergers that would increase the level of concentration according
to the HHI, although these mergers are capable of increasing competitive
balance and economic welfare. Not surprisingly, they decrease the level of
concentration according to CB.
Heubeck et al. (2006) discuss the inadequacy of the HHI and other
concentration indices that simply add pre-merger market shares of merging
rms to approximate post-merger shares. The basic problem is that this
method ignores second-order \industry wide strategic eects" that arise from
post-merger competition where rms strategically alter quantity or pricing
decisions.
The following example begins with the standard dominant/fringe rm
model. We next allow a subset of the fringe rms to merge at a level that
makes them competitive against the previously unique dominant rm. Pre-
merger status quo is such that the dominant rm sets its price based on
residual demand, leaving the fringe rms to take that price and choose output
accordingly. In post-merger setup, however, the newly merged rm is on
equal footing with the previously dominant rm and engages in Bertrand
competition where the remaining fringe rms take the price that results from
that competition as given.
The prot motive for the merging rms is akin to Caveat 3 (page 1245)
of Levin (1990): they merge in order to eliminate redundancies in xed
costs. We adopt this motive for two reasons. First, the elimination of xed-
cost redundancies is sucient to guarantee the protability of the merger.
Second, we wish to avoid variable production eciencies as their presence
would possibly lead to merger approval even if the HHI suggests otherwise
11
(recall the discussion in the Introduction).
Our specic example is as follows.4 Demand in the market is Q = 90 P ,
where Q is the total quantity produced by all rms and P is the market
price. The dominant rm has a cost of C = 50 + 1
2
q2d where qd is quantity it
produces, and each of the four smaller fringe rms has a cost of C = 45 + q2f
where qf is quantity each such rm produces. Inverse Residual Demand for
the dominant rm's product is therefore P = 30  1
3
qd. Then in this market
the dominant rm sets a price of $24 and produces 18 units, generating a
prot of $220. Suppose the fringe rms follow the dominant rm by accepting
that price; then each produces 12 units and earn prots of $99.
Now let two of the fringe rms merge in an eort to eliminate xed
cost redundancies and become strategically more competitive against the
dominant rm. Assume that the remaining two fringe rms remain on the
fringe, taking the equilibrium price arising between the previously dominant
rm and the newly merged rms as given. That price equilibrium is arrived at
via Bertrand competition for the residual demand left by the two remaining
fringe rms.5
The marginal cost curves of the rms that merged yield the cost function
of this newly-created dominant rm, C = 50 + 1
2
q2d0 , where the reduction
4Although this example is stylized and simple for illustrative purposes, the qualitative
results will hold for many other parameter values as well.
5The one caveat to the standard Bertrand model here is that rather than assuming
that the rm with the lower price serves the entire residual market, we assume that
the rm with the lower price has the option of serving the entire residual market but
may choose to only serve a portion of the market if serving the entire market becomes
prohibitively costly. If the lower-price rm serves less than the entire residual demand,
then the higher-price Bertrand competitor picks up the remaining residual demand. This
caveat is necessary because marginal cost is increasing in this example rather than being
constant as is commonly assumed in standard Bertrand models.
12
in xed costs has put the merged rm on equal footing with the previously
unique dominant rm. Given that there are only two remaining fringe com-
petitors, the Inverse Residual Demand curve facing the two Bertrand com-
petitors is now P = 45  1
2
qd0 .
The Bertrand equilibrium price in the game between the dominant rms
can easily veried to be $22:50. At that price the previously-dominant rm
as well as the newly-merged dominant rm each produces 22:5 units and each
earns $203:13 in prots. Each of the two remaining fringe rms now produces
12:25 units and each earns $92:81 in prots. For all prices above $22:50, each
rm nds it protable to lower its price if the other rm matches or goes
below that price.6 Once the price reaches $22:50, no rm nds it protable
to lower the price further as doing so will only give them the opportunity to
sell additional units at a price below the marginal cost of providing them.
The reduction in xed costs that accompanies the merger leads to joint
prots for the merged rm that are greater than the summed individual
prots they would have earned by remaining on the fringe. Because the
market price is lower than the pre-merger price and marginal costs have not
changed, the merger leads to an increase in welfare. Pre-merger, the market
shares were (1
3
; 1
6
; 1
6
; 1
6
; 1
6
). Post-merger, they become (1
3
; 1
3
; 1
6
; 1
6
), leading to
pre- and post-merger HHI measures of 0:22222 and 0:27777 respectively.
Alternatively, the pre- and post-merger CB(1) measures are 0:5 and 0:4.
6Once again, the argument deviates slightly from the standard Bertrand argument
that the rms nd this protable because they pick up the entire market. For instance,
hypothesize that both rms charge $22:51. The result then is that they split residual
demand, each supplying 44:49 units and making $203:12 in prots. By lowering their
price to $22:50, either rm can now sell 22:5 units at a prot, and slightly increase prots.
It is worth noting that the rm does not pick up the entire residual demand of 45 units at
the price of $22:50 because supplying any units beyond 22:5 units incurs a marginal cost
of Q that is greater than the price.
13
Thus, this example illustrates how a merger that is welfare enhancing can
decrease CB, but increase the HHI.
Extending the example further, we can use CB(2) by then allowing
the two remaining fringe rms to merge in order to compete with the two
dominant rms, putting all three rms on equal footing. It can be easily
conrmed that once the nal two fringe rms merge, the equilibrium Bertrand
outcome is for each rm to charge $22:50, resulting in output by each rm
of 22:5 units. There is no welfare loss since the pre- and post-merger prices
are the same. Using the pre- and post{ merger market shares of (1
3
; 1
3
; 1
6
; 1
6
)
and (1
3
; 1
3
; 1
3
) yield the respective pre- and post- HHI measures of 0:27777
and 0:33333. Likewise, the pre-and post-merger CB(2) measures are 0:8
and 0:66666, once again illustrating how a merger that is welfare enhancing
can decrease CB, but increase the HHI.
Finally, in our index the analyst must make a judgement about how many
rms to include inm, but oncem is chosen, a merger involving two small rms
decreases the index, and a merger involving at least one of the large rms
raises the index. One relevant question then is "what determinesm?" In some
cases, the industry analysts may have already determined it empirically, as
reported in Lamm (1981) that was mentioned above (as observed in the food
retailing industry, \growth in the 3 largest rms' shares have a signicant
positive eects on prices... In contrast, an increase in the market share of the
fourth largest rm causes a reduction in food prices"). In some other cases,
like in the example we have just provided above, a natural gap between the
market shares of rms may provide strong clues about m: E.g., if the market
shares prole is (1
3
; 1
6
; 1
6
; 1
6
; 1
6
), then it would be straightforward to deduce that
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m is 1, whereas if that prole is (1
3
; 1
3
; 1
6
; 1
6
), then one can deduce that m is 2.
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